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Air transportation is presently the fastest growing mode of freight
transportation. The imminent introduction of cargo aircraft with
capacities of up to 100 tons and greatly lowered operating costs will
spur this growth. But efficiencies achieved in air cargo operations can
be lost if ground transportation between the shipper and the airport
is unduly expensive or time consuming. Here the key lies with the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Normally motor vehicle movement
of property in interstate commerce is subject to Commission regu-
lation. But Commission authority over air cargo pickup and delivery
service is limited by section 203(b)(7a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, which exempts from Commission economic regulation motor
vehicle transportation "incidental to transportation by aircraft."' By
its narrow understanding of "incidental" the Commission has extended
its own jurisdiction while hampering the development of efficient
ground transportation for air cargo services.
The significance to the shipper of the incidental-to-air exemption
lies in the ability of carriers operating under the exemption to provide
more comprehensive service, specialized to the needs of air cargo oper-
ations, than can the ordinary, Commission-regulated, general com-
modities motor carrier. The exempt carrier is not required to possess
a certificate of public convenience and necessity.2 This frees him from
time-consuming applications for operating rights, which are normally
met by strong opposition from existing carriers.3 Moreover, because
the carrier is not tied to a particular route or area by a certificate,
1. 52 Stat. 1029 (1938); 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(7a) (1964). The section provides that noth-
ing in Part n (providing for motor carrier regulation) of the Interstate Commerce Act
(hereinafter "the Act')
except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours
of service of employees and safety of operations or standards of equipment shall
be construed to include ... (7a) the transportation of persons or property by motor
vehicle when incidental to transportation by aircraft.
2. See section 203(c) of the Act, 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1964); and
sections 206(a) and 209(a), 49 Stat. 551, 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 306(a)(1), 809(a)(l) (1964).
Section 222(a) of the Act provides for a penalty of up to $500 per day for operation with-
out a common carrier certificate or a contract carrier permit. 49 Stat. 564 (1935), 49
U.S.C. § 322(a) (1964).
3. Section 1.247(d) of the General Rules of Practice of the ICC, 31 Fro. Rio. 9926-27
(1966), provides that any person with operating rights "in conflict with that sought" by
an applicant for new authority may protest such applications. It seems dcear that the
Commission may deny an application for operating rights even in the absence of protest
from existing carriers, on the grounds that applicant has failed to show that the pro-
posed service is required by the public convenience and necessity. See, e.g., ICC v.
Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945).
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he is free to adjust quickly to changes in customer location or to the
appearance of new markets, both of which may happen suddenly in the
fast-growing air cargo industry.4 The exemption of the carrier from the
Commission's power to prescribe rate levels frees him to reflect cost
changes in his rate structure without first filing the rate changes with
the Commission, where they would be subject to Commission scru-
tiny, to objection by competing carriers, and potentially to suspension
and investigation."
This flexibility permitted by the exemption is valuable to air cargo
users, because rapid changes in aviation technology and changes in
the organization and scheduling of production by shippers may result
in radical shifts in the pattern of demand for air cargo over short
periods. Because air transportation is a premium service, used instead
of other forms of transportation primarily because of its speed, many
air cargo shipments will be of a quasi-emergency character. If a carrier
operating under the exemption is available, the shipper need not spend
the time seeking a regulated carrier authorized to carry the particular
commodity over the particular route involved. Nor need the shipper
worry whether the carrier appreciates the necessity for arrival of the
shipment at the airport in time to meet departing flights.
The legislative history of section 203(b)(7a) gives no explicit guid-
ance for the interpretation of the exemption. The Commission's posi-
tion is that "motor transportation is 'incidental' to transportation by
air when that motor transportation is limited to a bona fide collection,
delivery, or transfer service within a reasonable terminal area of the
air carrier."7 The phrase "service within a reasonable terminal area"
4. The Commission is normally unwilling to grant changes in the services authorized
by certificates of public convenience and necessity in order to follow the traffic. See,
e.g., Smith & Solomon Trucking Co., 61 M.C.C. 748, 752 (1953), afy'd, 120 F. Supp. 277(D.NJ. 1954).
5. Section 216(e) of the Act empowers the Commission to fix rates, 49 Stat. 558 (1935),
49 U.S.C. § 316(e) (1964). Section 216(g) permits suspension of any tariff or rate on com-
plaint of any interested party or upon the Commission's own initiative, and section 217
requires carriers to file and adhere to published tariffs. 49 Stat. 559, 560 (1935), 49 U.S.C.§§ 316(g), 317 (1964).
6. Section 203(b)(7a) was added to the Act by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and
the published legislative history of that statute is devoid of any clarification of the
exemption. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 11070), 52 Stat. 1029 (1938). This section was
added to the Act in conference, and no mention of it appears to have been made in the
floor debates upon the bill. The report of the House conferees only stated:
The conference agreement follows the provisions of the House amendment with the
following exceptions; ...(2) the Motor Carrier Act, 1936 [sic], is amended so as to
render its provisions inapplicable (with certain specified exceptions) to the trans-
portation of persons or property by motor vehicle when incidental to transportation
by aircraft.
H.R. RP. No. 2635, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 81 (1938).
7. Hazel Kenny, 61 M.C.C. 587, 595 (1953). A similar statement applicable to passenger
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is in turn used by the Commission to refer to "service which supple-
ments and combines with line-haul service" and which "is essentially
intra-community in character."" Under this definition, motor vehicle
service which is "intercommunity service ... falls outside the partial
exemption of section 203(b)(a)." This restriction to "intra-commu-
nity" service is warranted neither by the context of the exemption
within the Interstate Commerce Act nor by the economic characteris-
tics of air transportation."0
Development of ICC Control
When the Commission first considered the exemption, in a 1941
series of cases involving Railway Express use of motor vehicles, it
introduced without elaboration the belief that "incidental to trans-
portation by aircraft" did not include intercommunity traffic. Because
Railway Express provides ground pickup and delivery services for Air
Express shipments," the Commission had to decide whether Railway
Express required specific authority to transport Air Express shipments
by motor vehicle, or whether it could provide the Air Express services
under the shield of the 203(b)(7a) exemption. In two practically iden-
tical decisions (typical of others in the series), the Commission ruled
that movements by road of 12 and 15 miles between the towns affected
and the nearest airport city were not "incidental" to air transportation,
transportation is found in Motor Transportation of Passengers Incidental to Trans-
portation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 526, 533 (1964).
8. Zantop Air Transport, Inc., 102 M.C.C. 457, 461 (1966), quoting Commercial Zones
and Terminal Areas, 54 M.C.C. 21, 63 (1952) (decision establishing geographic limits of
surface freight forwarder and inter-city motor carrier terminal areas).
9. Zantop Air Transport, Inc., 102 M.C.C. 457, 462 (1966) (the Commission ruled that
transportation by motor vehicle of property having a prior or subsequent movement by
air, between Wilmington Airport and Baltimore is line-haul for-hire transportation by
motor vehicle not within the 203(b)(7a) exemption).
10. This note concentrates upon objections to Commission interpretation of section
203(b)(7a) as it has been applied to transportation of property incidental to trans-
portation by aircraft. For a large proportion of air travelers, the transportation to and
from airports takes on more social significance than economic significance ("bon voyage"
or "welcome" motivations induce friends or relatives to provide transportation). For
many others exempt transportation is readily available because the Commission has
decided that passengers when flying interstate to an airport are not moving in interstate
commerce when they purchase airport limousine service to an ultimate destination vthin
the state in which the airport is located. See Motor Transportation of Passengers Inci-
dental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 526, 536 (1964). Only if the passenger
were holding a through ticket, covering at once the interstate air and the intrastate
motor transportation, would the Commission consider whether or not the intrastate
limousine service were within the incidental-to-air exemption. Ibid. Narrow interpreta-
tion of the exemption therefore has a much greater effect upon air cargo than upon
air passengers.
11. The exclusive role of Railway Express in the provision of Air Express services-
as distinct from general air freight-is discussed in Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B.
473, 476-90 (1948). See generally Wilson, Air Freight and Air Ecpress, 15 Lsw, & Co.%MIu.
PROB. 37 (1950).
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and required specific authority.'2 No discussion or further reasoning
was given.' 3
After World War II, the boom in air cargo caused many firms to
seek to operate air cargo collection and distribution services under
the shield of the exemption. 14 In the first major case of this period,
Sky Freight Delivery Service, Inc.,'5 the Commission held that although
the distances involved were greater than those in the earlier Railway
Express cases, extensive geographic coverage alone could not defeat
the exemption.
In determining whether a movement by motor is "incidental" to a
prior or subsequent movement by air or is in fact an independent con-
necting carrier service, distance alone is not a controlling considera-
tion, and this is particularly true in the area around New York City. 0
In subsequent decisions, however, the Commission made it clear
that to be within the exemption, service must be (with the exception
of emergencies when mechanical failure or weather conditions make
flying impossible) intracommunity collection, delivery, or transfer
service.'7 In the 1953 Hazel Kenny case, the Commission held that,
12. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 31 M.C.C. 332 (1941) (12 miles); Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 31 M.C.C. 385, 390 (1941):
... applicant's transportation of air express shipments by motor vehicle between
Providence and Bristol, a distance of 15 miles, constitutes a line-haul operation. Such
transportation is not considered to be "incidental to transportation by aircraft"
within the meaning of the exemption provisions. Therefore, applicant requires
authority from us for its transportation of air-express shipments, moving in inter-
state or foreign commerce, between these points.
13. One of the three Commission members who decided both cases, stated without
discussion that 203(b)(7a) should not be interpreted to require certification of Railway
Express for the motor carriage of shipments with prior or subsequent movement by air.
31 M.C.C. 385, 391 (1941); 31 M.C.C. 332, 336 (1941).
14. The post-war development of air cargo service is discussed in Durham & Feldstein,
Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air Freight Industry, 34 VA. L. RV.
769, 770-76 (1948).
15. 47 M.C.C. 229 (1947). Sky Freight sought common carrier authority for air cargo
ground services in the New York area, or, in the alternative, exemption from the certifi-
cation requirement under 203(b)(7a). Because there are no statutory provisions or Com-
mission rules providing for the claim of exempt status under 203(b)(7a), the normal
practice for firms wishing to operate motor transport of persons or property in connec-
tion with air transportation is to apply for a common carrier certificate, suggesting, in
the process, that the Commission should dismiss the application because the proposed
service falls under the 203(b)(7a) exemption. The alternative is operation without appli-
cation for a certificate and the risk of subjecting oneself to Commission enforcement
proceedings for operating non-exempt service without a certificate of public convenience
and necessity.
16. Id. at 241.
17. In a 1948 case, the Commission recognized that "sporadic and irregular" emer-
gency operations were incidental to transportation by aircraft, but commented that
normally, "when a motor service ... becomes in effect an interterminal or intercity
service it can no longer be . . .merely 'incidental' or subordinate .. . but . . .must
be looked upon as an independent line-haul service." Theodore Edward Graff, 48 M.C.C.
310, 315 (1948). Subsequent cases have recognized the continuing vitality of the emer.
gency transportation rule, e.g., Cyril P. Michaud, 73 M.C.C. 677 (1957).
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except for emergency service, the equation of "incidental" to intra-
community terminal area service was the only permissible interpreta-
tion of the exemption.'8 The Commission, however, chose not to pro-
vide fixed mileage limits to the area about each airport in which
pickup and delivery service could be provided. 19 Instead, it ruled that
the exemption would apply only for shipments moving on a through
air bill of lading, with both the pickup and delivery points contained
in existing air carrier tariffs for pickup and delivery service.-  Because
the Civil Aeronautics Board had for some years limited air carrier
pickup and delivery service tariffs to a maximum of 25 miles from
airports (except for major cities like New York), the Commission ac-
tion effectively limited the exemption to a maximum 25 mile radius.
This rule was upgraded to a Commission regulation in Motor Trans-
portation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, decided
in 1964.21
This tying of the exemption to air carrier tariffs on file with the
Civil Aeronautics Board had the virtue of providing the Commission
with a simple dividing line between exempt and non-exempt service.
Its vices were two. First, the tie to the air carrier tariffs creates an aura
of external sanction for the limitation. But the CAB's limitation upon
the extent of air carrier pickup and delivery tariffs has no relation to
18. Hazel Kenny, 61 M.C.C. 587, 595 (1953) (report of the Commission on further
hearing). This decision reversed an earlier decision of the Commission, reported at 49
M.C.C. 182 (1949), in which Kenny had been held to possess the right to operate air
cargo collection and distribution service up to fifty miles from Pittsburgh under the
203(b)(7a) exemption. The assertion on rehearing that the only permissible interpretation
of the exemption limited it to terminal areas was not accompanied by any discussion of
the reasoning by which the Commission arrived at this conclusion.
19. 61 M.C.C. 587, 592-93 (1953).
20. Id. at 595-96.
21. 95 M.C.C. 71 (1964), codified in 49 C.F.R. § 210A0 (1966 Supp.). A similar rcgu-
lation was established for "incidental" transportation of passengers. Motor Transporta-
tion of Passengers Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 526 (1964), 49
C.F.P. § 210.45 (1966 Supp.). "Incidental" passenger transportation was restricted to a
flat twenty-five miles by the regulation. This was prompted by the fact that passenger"
are normally ticketed by the airlines only from airport to airport. and they arrange
their own transportation to and from airports. See discussion, supra note 10. Airline
tariffs therefore make no provision for radius of passenger collection and delivery seriice
around the airports, and the Commission's regulation could not tie the limits of exempt
passenger transportation to the published tariffs of the airlines.
This rule-making proceeding was prompted by a temporary aberration of Dision
One of the Commission from earlier decisions construing 203(b)(7a). The Disiion held
in a 1962 certification proceeding that:
.it follows logically from a consideration of the language in section 203(b)(7a)
that whenever a limousine . .. transports an air passenger to or from the airport
terminal as part of the passenger's continuing move from origin to destination, such
transportation is a livery service provided for the use of passengers of airlines and
is dearly dependent upon and incidental to such air service.
The Hatom Corp., 88 M.C.C. 653, 656-57 (1962) (2-1 decision). This dechion was prompti)
reversed by the whole Commission, The Hatom Corp., 91 M.C.C. 725 (1962).
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the incidental-to-air exemption.2 2 In fact, the CAB has specifically
indicated that its control over these tariffs does not represent an at-
tempt to define the extent of the exemption.2 3 Therefore there is
nothing about the CAB's limitation which requires the Commission
to use it to define the limits of incidental-to-air transportation. Second,
the tie to air carrier tariffs has no consistent relation to the principle
that the exemption does not extend to "interterminal" or "intercity"
service. If the principle is that "intercity ...independent line-haul
service" is not exempt,24 then the use of air carrier tariffs on file with
the Civil Aeronautics Board is but an arbitrary substitute, and a poor
one, for reasoned application of the rule.
The use of air carrier tariffs to define "incidental to transportation
by aircraft" leads to odd results. Business A, within a town generating
a high volume of air cargo, receives regular air cargo pickup and deliv-
ery service in accordance with published airline tariff provisions. The
owner of business B, across the street in a different jurisdiction, can-
not flag down the truck with a shipment bound for the same airport,
the same airline, and the same final destination unless the airline has
included B's town in its pickup and delivery tariff. And if B and other
potential shippers in his town have little occasion to use air transport,
the airlines may not care to incur the costs of asking the Board to
extend the coverage of its pickup and delivery tariffs or of including
and maintaining additional tariff entries. The use of "incidental" to
distinguish between two parties so similarly situated seems indefen-
sible.
The 1964 Motor Transportation of Property decision recognized
the potential incompatibility of the air carrier tariff rule and the inter-
community-intracommunity distinction by providing for proceedings
before the Commission to determine whether any particular point
22. The CAB limitation applies only to collection and distribution service provided
when the airlines have seen fit to arrange in advance, through tariff publication, to
provide service to the points in question.
The CAB has demonstrated in several instances that it has no inherent bias against
ground services provided over distances much greater than 25 miles. See Flying Tiger
Line, Inc., 30 C.A.B. 242 (1959), aff'd sub nor. City of Philadelphia N. CAB, 289 F.2d 770
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (the GAB permitted the discontinuance of the Flying Tiger Line's west
coast cargo service from Philadelphia Airport in favor of motor vehicle service providing
connections with faster west coast service via Newark Airport). The CAB has also per-
mitted Emery Air Freight, in several recent cases, to provide pickup and delivery services
for its air freight forwarding operations well over twenty-five miles from Detroit and
Boston. See CAB Docket No. 15327, Application of Emery Air Freight for Authority to
File Pickup and Delivery Tariff, in Traffic World, December 11, 1965, p. 10; and Law
Motor Freight, Inc. v. CAB, 364 F.2d 139 (1st Cir. 1966).
23. 29 Fed. Reg. 6275 (1964) (promulgating 14 C.F.R. § 222, "Air Cargo Pickup and
Delivery Zones').
24. Theodore Edward Graff, 48 M.C.C. 310, 315 (1948).
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was actually within the limits of "incidental" service, regardless of its
inclusion or non-inclusion in an air carrier tariff.25 It was plain that
the Commission feared the appearance of air carrier pickup and deliv-
ery tariffs which, under past Commission standards, would dearly
involve intercommunity transportation.20
Such a case arose almost immediately when Zantop Air Transport,
a supplemental cargo carrier, was charged with engaging in illegal
line-haul motor transportation.2 7 Zantop had been transporting in its
own vehicles, from Wilmington Airport to Baltimore, shipments with
an immediately prior air movement from Detroit. Because Zantop was
apparently operating within the limits of its tariffs on file with the Civil
Aeronautics Board,28 the Commission was faced with a case in which
it could not rely on the air carrier tariffs to exclude the service from
the exemption.2 9 To find that the service was not "incidental" the
Commission reverted to the 25-mile limit and argued that this limit
could not be enlarged to include within the exemption any area char-
acterizable as a "separate and distinct community.'"
Thus, at present, service which can be classified as intercommunity
service cannot be "incidental to transportation by aircraft" and can-
not come within the exemption, whether or not the places involved
are included in air carrier pickup and delivery tariffs. Exempt service
can only be that bona fide pickup, delivery, or transfer service which
is provided within the particular community-consisting of a core
city and its environs-in which the airport is located.01 All other ser-
25. 95 M.C.C. 71 (1964), 49 C.F.R. §§ 210.40(c), 210.45(c) (1966 Supp.).
26. The Motor Transportation of Property decision made it clear that the Commission
was relinquishing no control over the exemption by tying it in the first instance to the
airline-published pickup and delivery tariffs. In order to make the new rule "consistent
with our statutory responsibility to insure that transportation ... exempt under ection
203(b)(7a) is truly 'incidental'," the Commission provided that "a proceeding may be
instituted looking toward the definition of the geographical extent of the 203(b)(7a)
exemption at a particular point." 95 M.C.C. at 87. (Emphasis added.)
27. Zantop Air Transport, Inc., 96 M.C.C. 18 (1964).
28. Zantop was not using highway operations to provide air cargo service to a city
which it was not permitted to serve. see the second Zantop case, 102 M.C.C. 457, 45859
(1966). Thus Zantop was probably operating literally within the terms of the 1964 I.C.C.
regulation, in the sense that it was not providing pickup and delivery service beyond
the limits within which the CA,. had authorized it to provide such service.
29. This was in contrast to cases like Hazel Kenny, 61 M.C.C. 587 (1953). in which the
Commission limited the motor vehicle operator to direct air carrier tariffs currently on
file for the Pittsburgh area.
30. 96 M.C.C. at 22-23 (1964). The reasoning is from the report of the joint board
which investigated the alleged violation, but the board's report was adopted by the
Commission as its own. Id. at 19. Zantop appealed the Commission decision, Zantop Air
Transport, Inc. Y. United States, 250 F.Supp. 623 (FD. Mich. 1965), and the court re-
manded the case for failure to show findings of fact. On reconsideration, the full Com.
mission, one member dissenting, reaffirmed its decision, Zantop Air Transport, Inc., 102
M.C.C. 457 (1966).
31. See, e.g., 102 M.C.C. 457, 462 (1966). C'Our concern, and the concern of the exemp.
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vice involving cargo with prior or subsequent movement by air is line-
haul service subject to Commission economic regulation.
The Commission has yet to present any persuasive argument that
208(b)(7a) was intended to exempt only service between the airport
and the city with reference to which the airport was constructed. The
Commission has consistently maintained that the exemption applies
only to bona fide terminal area service-that is, intracommunity ser-
vice-but has nullified that principle in all those cases in which air
carrier tariffs are on file, covering service within 25 miles of airports.
The only evidence which the Commission has adduced to justify the
limitation of the exemption to intracommunity service is a false anal-
ogy with another section of the Act.
Arguments from the Statutes: Analogies Proper and Improper
The Commission asserted in Zantop that the exemption is intended
solely to insure "that each city have bona fide collection and delivery
service to and from its designated airports." 32 This narrow view of the
exemption's purpose appears to stem at least in part from the Commis-
sion's claim that the exemption is analogous to the "terminal areas"
exemption in section 202(c) of the Act.8 3 The Commission has reiter-
ated this claim since 1948, 34 at one time baldly asserting without quali-
fication that "on analogy with section 202(c) of the act . . . motor
transportation which is incidental ... must be limited to a bona fide
terminal, as distinguished from line-haul, service." 35
Unfortunately, this is an indefensible analogy. Under the Interstate
Commerce Act, railroads, water carriers, and freight forwarders are
normally not permitted to operate motor vehicles as part of the trans-
portation services they provide.36 Section 202(c) creates an exception
to this xule by permitting these carriers to operate, directly or by
contract with others, "transfer, -collection, or delivery services" by
motor vehicle "within terminal areas." But this authority is limited to
tion, is that each city have bona fide scollection and delivery service to and from its
designated airports.')
32. Ibid.
33. 54 Stat 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1964).
S4. Zantop Air Transport, Inc., 102 M.C.C. 457, 461 (1966); Motor Transportation of
Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71, 85 (1964); The Hatom
Corp., 91 M.C.C. 725, 730 (1962) (the second Hatom case); Sky Freight Delivery Service,
Inc., 47 M.C.C. 229, 241-42 (1947).
55. Second Hatom case, 91 M.C.C. at 730.
36. This is made clear by section 202(a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 543 (1935). 49 U.S.C. § 302
(1964), which places all -transportation of persons or property by motor vehicle in inter-
state commerce under Part II of the Act, subject only to subsequent exemptions in Part
II. Thus, for example, a railroad must fall within an exemption or be certified by the
Commission in order legally to operate motor vehicle services in interstate commerce.
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transportation by motor vehicle "incidental to transportation or ser-
vice" provided by railroads, water carriers, or freight forwarders. By
contrast, 203(b)(7a) simply exempts transportation "incidental to trans-
portation by aircraft" from Commission economic regulation. The
Commission has nowhere explained how the combination of "inci-
dental" and "terminal areas" in 202(c) says no more than "incidental"
alone3 The most reasonable interpretation of section 202(c) is that
"terminal areas" limits the geographic area within which the exempt
service may be performed, and "incidental" limits the carrier to the
provision of pickup and delivery service to traffic which it transports
into or out of the terminal area by rail, water, or freight forwarder
service.38
Statutory implication that 202(c) differs in scope from 203(b)(7a)
may be found in Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act, regulating
freight forwarders. Section 418 makes it unlawful for the freight for-
warder to operate his own vehicles or to utilize the services of any
carriers other than specified common carriers, including "common
carriers by motor vehicle engaged in transportation exempted under
the provisions of 203(b)(7a) of this Act... ." But an exception to
this limitation permits the freight forwarder, "in the performance
within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or delivery services," to
provide such services himself or to hire anyone to do it for him.39
This distinction betwveen service within terminal areas and service pro-
vided under the incidental-to-air exemption, strongly suggests that
Congress viewed 203(b)(7a) as meaning more than merely service
within terminal areas.40
The second section to which the incidental-to-air exemption might
be compared is the local cartage exemption (section 203(b)(8)), permit-
37. Since 202(c) was added to, the Act in 1940, 54 Stat. 920 (1940), and. 203(b)(7a> was
added txwo years previously, 5Z StaL 1029 (1938). if Congress had intended in. 1938 that
"terminal area" was to be implied in 203(b)(7a), there would have been no occasion to
use "terminal area" in 202(c) in 194.
38. For example, "incidental" in 202(cq limits a rail carrier to the provision of pickup
and delivery service within terminal areas to traffic which it. as a rail carrier. moves
into or out of the terminal area. Without "incidental" in the section, the railroad would
appear to be authorized to provide collection and delivery services in terminal areas for
any carriers, not just for itselL
39. 56 Stat. 297-9& (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 1018 (1964).
40. The Commission sought to dismiss the omission of "terminal areas" in section
203(b)(7a) by calling it "not significant" and saying that it is "readily conceivable" that
the terminal area of an air carrier may be greater than the permissible terminal area
of a freight forwarder at the same point. Sky Freight Delivery Services, Inc., 47 MC.C
229, 241-42 (1947). Granting that a size difference in fonvarder and air carrier terminal
areas may be "readily conceivable," section 418 would still appear to weaken, rather
than strengthen, the Commission's argument that 203(b)(7a) implicitly contains a restric-
tion to terminal area service.
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ting motor vehicles operating in a "zone adjacent to and commercially
a part of any .. .municipality" to be free of economic regulation
under Part II of the Act.41 This exemption defines the limit of the
operating rights permitted to firms offering local cartage type services
without Commission certification of public convenience and neces-
sity.42
The local cartage exemption was part of the original scheme of
motor regulation, thus antedating the incidental-to-air exemption by
three years. It seems plausible that if Congress had intended the inci-
dental-to-air exemption to mean some specific geographic limitation,
paralleling in conception if not in actual size the local cartage exemp-
tion, the two exemptions would have used parallel language. But no
such parallelism is present: "a zone adjacent to and commercially a
part of" a municipality defines a geographic boundary, but "incidental
to transportation by aircraft" has no such geographic connotation.
There are thus two statutes chronologically bracketing the inci-
dental-to-air exemption, each of which involves an exemption ex-
pressed in geographic terms. The fact that neither of these alternative
limitations was used in the incidental-to-air exemption strongly sug-
gests that the exemption was not meant to be defined in terms of some
particular, limited area.
A wider interpretation of the exemption is supported by its origin
in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.43 Although the history of the
exemption itself is concededly obscure,44 the Act as a whole was a pro-
motional act, aimed at "[t]he encouragement and development of civil
aeronautics" and "[t]he encouragement and development of an air-
41. 49 Stat. 546 (1935); 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(8) (1964). This exemption is also distin-
guished from the 203(b)(7a) exemption by the existence of a qualifying phrase, inserted
between 203(b)(7a) and 203(b)(8), permitting the Commission to deny the exemption In
203(b)(8) (and all subsequent subsections of 203(b)) whenever this is found to be necessary
in order to achieve the goals set forth in Declaration of National Transportation Policy,
54 Stat. 899 (1940).
42. Although 203(b)(8) appears to refer only to interstate and foreign commerce (thus
suggesting that the exemption is applicable only to commercial zones extending across
state boundaries or serving as foreign trade gateways), the Commission has held that the
exemption is applicable to all "purely local intra-terminal motor-carrier transportation,"
for "[n]o logical reason appears for exempting only those who physically cross a State
boundary. ... Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 46 M.C.C. 665, 677-78 (1946).
In 1953, the Commission concluded that the terminal areas of motor carriers and freight
forwarders under section 202(c) were to be equated to the commercial zones of the local
cartage exemption. Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 54 M.C.C. 21, 108-110 (1952).
Major cities have uniquely defined commercial zones; for other cities, the permissible
distance is graduated with the size of the city-up to five miles from the boundary of
the core city for cities with a population of over 100,000. Both the general rules and
individually defined zones are found at 49 C.F.R. § 170 (1964).
43. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 1107(j), 52 Stat. 1029 (1938).
44. See note 6 supra.
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transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs
of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States. . .. 15
If the exemption was intended to aid in the promotion and develop-
ment of air transportation, then it would seem to follow that its evi-
dent purpose-freedom from Interstate Commerce Commission regu-
lation of motor transportation of persons and property to and from
airports-should be construed widely, not narrowly.
To the extent that a statute, like a woman, may be known by the
company it keeps, the exemption ought to mean more than merely
an exemption for limited terminal area services. None of the eight
exemptions in section 203(b) prior to the incidental-to-air exemption
distinguishes between line-haul and terminal services.4 0 Specific uses
of vehicles are exempted from regulation, regardless of the length of
haul or whether the haul is inter-community or intra-community.
No attempt was made to limit hotel bus service to the nearest con-
venient or practicable common carrier passenger depot, nor to limit
the farmer-operated vehicle exemption to hauls between the farm and
-the nearest commercial center. The rest of section 203(b) thus provides
fio support for restriction of the incidental-to-air exemption to a lim-
ited geographic range.47 If the interpretation of the exemption is to
be colored at all by its context in 203(b), a broad interpretation of
"incidental" is necessary.
Economic Characteristics of Air Cargo Pickup and Delivery
A broad interpretation of the exemption would be more in line
with the economic realities of the market for air freight transportation.
The limited scope given the exemption by the Commission bears
little relation to the actual interactions of air cargo collection and
delivery services with air transportation.
45. Sections 2(f), 2(a), 52 Stat. 980 (1938). These provisions arc substantially preserved
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which supercede the 1938 Act, 72 Stat. 740 (1958),
49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964) ('consideration of matters in public interest by Board').
46. 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1964). The section is entitled "Vehicles
excepted from operation of law." It limits the exception to freedom from economic
regulation, and lists (1) school buses, (2) taxicabs, (3) hotel bus service between hotels
and carrier terminals, (4) national park vehicles operated by concessionaires under the
control of the federal government, (4a) farmer-operated vehicles moving commodities to
and from the farm, (5) vehicles of agricultural marketing cooperatives, (6) vehides .. d
solely for moving agricultural commodities, (7) newspaper delivery vehicles, and (7a) the
incidental-to-air exemption.
47. Chairman Bush, the lone dissenter in the second Zantop case, also emphasized
the significance of the other exemptions prior to (7a): "It is self-evident that motor car-
riers falling within the exceptions of section 203(b) ... are authorized to perform line-
haul transportation in interstate commerce, but such carriers are totally exempt from
the certificate requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act." 102 M.C.C. at 465 (1966).
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Presumably shippers use air cargo only because the advantages of
minimal transit time and lower packaging and insurance costs out-
weigh the lower direct costs of competing modes of surface trans-
portation.48 But most consignors and consignees of air cargo do not
happen to be located in or next to airports; hence surface transporta-
tion is, required between the airport and ultimate origins and desti-
nations. This leads to two questions: what surface transportation, and
what airport?
If the shipper and receiver of air cargo use their own vehicles to,
move cargo to and from airports, there is no regulatory problem, for
private carriage is not subject to Commission economic regulation.4
But only firms with relatively high, steady flows of air cargo are likely
to prefer to do their own carriage. Most firms are therefore likely to
prefer that plant-to-airport service be provided by others. Regular
common. carriers, however, are not always able to provide adequate
service, for their operational patterns, especially in the relatively small
shipments characteristic of air cargo, are not conducive to minimiza-
tion of plant-to-airport transit time.1 Only if they can be induced to
provide separate air cargo service, by-passing freight consolidation
terminals in order to move shipments directly from shipper to airport,
will existing common carriers be able to approach the quality of ser-
vice that the specialist in air cargo collection and distribution can
achieve. And unless the carrier is already certified to serve the whole
region about the airport, it will not be in a position to supply such
services most efficiently.
To the extent that existing motor common carriers are not geared
to, provide accelerated air cargo pickup and delivery service to and
from airports, better service may be obtained from the specialist air
48. The demand for air cargo has been broken down into three categories:(1) Traffic for which air movement is directly price-competitive with surface move.
ment. (This is still rare.)
(2) Traffic which is so perishable that it can move only by air.(3) Emergency -traffic where faster air service results in net savings either by com-
manding premium pricem for early arrival, or by avoiding continuing, unproduc.
tive operating costs due to factors such as parts shortage or break-down.
Carter, Air Cargo Economics, 15 Iw & CONvaMEP. PRon. 786, 86 (1950).
49. 49 Stat. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 304(a)(3) (1964).
50. Motor common carriers handling less-than-truckload traffic will typically move
such shipments through one or two classification terminals. A shipment w I be picked
up by a local service vehicle, moved into the terminal, sorted out with other shipments
bound for the same general area, moved by line-haul vehicle to the classification ter-
minal for that area, sorted again to the appropriate delivery route, and finally loaded
onto the local service vehicle for delivery. For service within the limits of a single
classification area, one terminal handling and the line-haul segment of the journey will
of course be eliminated. But such service will still be slower than service operating
directly from. airports ,to consignors and consignees.
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cargo carrier51 But as discussed above,5 2 the structure of Commission
motor carrier regulation is not likely to encourage the emergence of
such specialist carriers. The economic patterns of the flow of air cargo
to and from individual airports may extend far beyond the existing
limits of the incidental-to-air exemption. We may term the geographic
area from which air freight may flow into a particular airport the
"catchment basin" of that airport. The geographic extent of the catch-
ment basin of any given airport will be economically determined by
such factors as the cost of motor transport to and from the airport,
the quality and quantity of air cargo service available at the airport,
and savings accruing to shipper and receiver from accelerated arrival
time of each individual shipment.r3
Commission attempts to place geographic limits on the incidental-
to-air exemption fail to recognize that these factors are not static and
do not affect each user of air freight in an identical manner. In the
first place, the airlift capacity of flights at a given airport may vary.
Few airports generate enough traffic to make economically feasible the
designation of the airport as a stop for all-cargo equipment, but almost
all airports will provide adequate capacity for the shipper with the
occasional 250 pound shipment. Local service airports may be served
neither by all-cargo equipment or by the passenger aircraft with cargo
holds. Regular shippers of air cargo in cities served by these airports
51. Section 1003(b) of the Federal Aviation Act permits airlines to establish joint
rates and through service with other common carriers. Rates established under the
authority of 'this section are subject to review by a joint board composed of C.A.B. and
I.C.C. members. While such joint rates and through services are not uncommon in the
air cargo industry, they do not provide a full solution to the collection and delivery
problem because the route limitations on existing motor carriers make it improbable
that any single carrier will have the route pattern necessary to permit the most efficient
structuring Of collection and delivery services around each airport. 72 Stat. 791 (1958).
49 U.S.C. § 1483(b) (1964).
52. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
53. The concept of an urban area's economic "catchment basin" has been recogaized
in transportation planning studies.
Even where the centre of the urban region was a single city, and not a conurbation,the urban region would have to take in the whole of the surrounding catchment
area, going at least as far out as the "traflie watershed" or limit of car-commuter
travel. In a few cases only in this country [Great Britain] there would be an over-
lap, representing an equal pull by two or more large centers; but on the whole
the "'spheres of traffic influence' of the big cities and conurbations are dearly
ascertainable.
REPORT OF THE STMING GRoUP, TRAFFIC IN TowNs § 46 (1954) (The 'Budanan Report").
Film Transit, Inc., 98 NLC.C. 145 (1965) suggests the possible scope of the "catchment
basin" around the Memphis, Tennessee, airport. The Commission held that Film Transit
was operating beyond the 203(b)(7a) exemption when it accepted shipments from an air
freight forwarder for transportation by motor vehicle from Memphis to Jonesboro (72
miles from Memphis airport), West Helena (82 miles), and Osceola (57 miles), Arkansas;
Corinth (88 miles) and Lambert (84 miles), Alisissippi; and Bolivar (63 miles) and Dyers-
burg (78 miles), Tennessee. Id. at 153.
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may be forced to rely on more distant airports, where higher-capacity
equipment is available.
Secondly, some airports may simply be too small to handle the air-
craft which the cargo-generating potential of an area might justify.
If the local service airport for a community is not authorized to handle
four-engined aircraft, air transport for large items must be obtained
through a more distant airport.
Thirdly, simple frequency of service at an airport may be significant.
A physically adequate airport may be little used: or the airport may
be heavily used,' but with an insufficient traffic flow to the desired
cargo destination to justify through service. A more distant airport
may therefore be sought in order to obtain earlier aircraft departure
or to obtain through service without the delay of cargo interchange
enroute.
All these sets of circumstances often combine to make it impossible
to determine, in the abstract, which airport is "the" airport serving a
shipper at a particular point.54 This will be especially true of shippers
located in the Northeast megalopolis, and probably is also true of ship-
pers along the southern edge of the Great Lakes and in Southern
California. A definition of "incidental" which took into account these
characteristics of air cargo collection and distribution would not dis-
tinguish between incidental and nonincidental surface transportation
according to the distance from the airport to the shipper or receiver,
or according to whether the service is intra-community or inter-
community in nature. If a more distant airport is chosen because it
(a) is the nearest source of adequate airlift capacity; or (b) permits
faster overall service than closer airports, then the connecting surface
transport ought to be considered "incidental" to air transport. One
principle which follows from this is that if the nearest airport to the
shipper is used, whatever the distance involved, the transportation
should normally be viewed as "incidental" to transport by air.0
54. The shipper thirty miles north of Cheyenne, Wyoming, probably has little choice,
but consider the electronics plant located just off the New Jersey Turnpike, opposite
Trenton. The nearest airport is the Mercer County Airport, serving Trenton. But there
are three other airports-Newark, Kennedy and Philadelphia International-which could
rationally be used by a shipper seeking to minimize transit time yet which are all fifty
miles or more from our hypothetical shipper. For a similar discussion of how the ICCI's
limitation restricts the development of air forwarder service see Snow, Air Freight For.
warding: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 32 J. oF Amt L. & Commnts. 485, 487-88, 492-94
(1966).
55. There are no grounds for disagreement with the Commission's requirement that the
exemption apply only to cargo having an immediately prior or subsequent movement
by air. See 49 C.F.R. § 210.40 (1966 Supp.). Otherwise all commodities which at one time
or another had moved by air might arguably fall within the exemption.
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This interpretation would not keep the Commission out of all
adjudication involving the exemption, for at some time there comes
a point at which surface transportation is no longer "incidental."
Motor transportation from Chicago to New York, followed by air
transportation to London, is not "incidental" to the air transportation:
were the shipper motivated by the need for faster service he could
have found it at Chicago.
One potential objection is raised by this test. It leaves open the
possibility that regulated motor common carriers could carry air cargo
shipments on an ad hoc basis, charging different (presumably lower)
rates for such shipments in comparison with other similar shipments
moving exclusively in surface transportation. This mixture of regu-
lated and unregulated traffic may be thought to present undesirable
regulatory difficulties. Common carrier rate regulation may be made
unduly complex by the simultaneous carriage of regulated and unregu-
lated traffic.
This objection could be avoided by limitation of the exemption to
the use of vehicles in air cargo collection and distribution. If the rest
of section 203(b) is examined, all of the other subsections exempt, im-
plicitly or explicitly, vehicles when used in prescribed ways.0 If "motor
transportation of persons or property" in 203(b)(7a) is interpreted to
mean operation of vehicles for the purpose of carrying persons or
property incidental to transportation by aircraft, a mixture of regu-
lated and unregulated traffic on the same vehicle will be avoided. This
would permit the provision of air cargo collection and distribution
services by a regulated motor common carrier, when the carrier assigns
vehicles exclusively to that service, instead of combining the air-cargo
service with its general, over-the-road line-haul services. 7
This interpretation of the exemption would make it possible for
the airlines, air freight users, and surface carriers of air freight to and
from airports to develop collection and distribution services based on
the economic characteristics of the catchment basin of each airport,
56. See note 55 supra, and accompanying text. The title of 203(b) is "Vehicles ex-
cepted from operation of law." See also Determination of Exempted Agricultural Com-
modities, 52 M.C.C. 511, 523 (1951) C'The . .. exemption contained in ,ection 103(b)(6
is directed to the motor vehicles, not to the transportion of 'agricultural com-
modities . . .")
57. If exempt and non-exempt operations are segregated by vehicles, the Commiraion
can determine without great difficulty whether or not the carrier is using its regulated
operations to contribute to the finandal viability of its non-regulated operations. This.
determination will be much more difficult if the Commission must face the difficulty of
allocating vehicle operation costs between exempt and non-exempt traffic carried on,
the same vehicle.
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rather than on the Commission's view of what constitutes intra-
community pick-up and delivery service.58 Moreover, it is an inter-
pretation which is consistent with some prior statements of the Com-
mission. 59 Undeveloped ideas in several previous Commission decisions
could be used to arrive at the results herein advocated.
In the Sky Freight case, the Commission recognized the reasons
behind the use of air transportation instead of surface transportation.
The keynote of air transportation is speed in transit, and sub-
stantially higher rates are paid for this type of service. The same
factors which prompt the use of air freight service in the first
instance would likewise require that such traffic ordinarily move
from and to the nearest airport and will tend to minimize the
distance involved in "incidental-to-air" motor hauls.00
The Commission should have realized that there are situations in
which the factors such as speed "which prompt the use of air freight"
might require that the freight move to an airport not the closest to
shipper or receiver, and might "require" relatively long motor hauls. 01
58- The CAB has indicated that it will authorize extensions of air carrier tariffs
covering pickup and delivery services
in the light of whether the proposed service is truly air cargo pickup and delivery
with the use of specialized equipment (vans or straight trucks) and geared to meet-
ing airline schedules and oriented to customer air ,transportation needs, as distin-
guished from line-haul or over-the-road surface transport.
29 Fed. Reg. 6276 (1964). Transportation "geared to meeting airline schedules and ori-
ented to customer air transportation needs" may or may not be performed within any
particular distance of an airport. See also the Flying Tiger case, cited in note 22 supra,
involving CAB authorization of pickup and delivery tariffs covering more than 90 miles,
59. This interpretation of the exemption does no violence to the accepted definition
of "incidental"-even though the Commission has sought to justify its own interpretation
by recourse to the dictionaries, e.g., in Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to
Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71, 84-85 (1964). "Incidental" may be defined as
"occurring or liable to occur in fortuitous or subordinate conjunction with something
else.," SHORcTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 978 (3d ed. 1962). Under the assumption that
the advantages realized by the use of air transportation stem from minimization of overall
transportation time, the motor service which makes possible the realization of this goal
of minimizing time through use of air service would seem. to be In subordinate con-
junction with the air service. That is, the shipper is concerned with the most readily
available air service, and whether he is twenty-five or thirty miles from the airport is
more or less a fortuitous circumstance which ought to be irrelevant for purposes of
regulation.
60. 47 M.C.C. 229, 240 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
61. In a companion case to Sky Freight the Commission discussed the exemption In
terms of a distinction between intra-community and inter-community services. It com-
mented that 203(b)(7a) should not be interpreted as applying "to motor carrier operations
in the nature of substituted motor-for-air service in lieu of line-haul air carrier opera-
tions." Teterboro Motor Transportation, Ina, 47 M.C.C. 247, 255 (1947). This suggests
that in formulating its interpretation of 203(b)(7a), the Commission simply failed to
consider the possibility that inter-community motor vehicle service could be anything
other than "in lieu of line-haul air carrier operations." The test advocated in this note
is, in practical effect, analogous to what the Commission said in Teterboro; one asks,
are motor earner operations substituting for line-haul air carrier operations? The differ-
ence comes from the tempering of the test by the realization that the economic possi-
bility of using air transportation instead of motor transportation, rather than the mere
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In the decision establishing the limits of motor carrier and freight
forwarder terminal areas under section 202(c), the Commission sug-
gested that service which is "incidental" to another transportation
service in the context of the incidental-to-air exemption is not "neces-
sarily" a bona fide intra-community pickup and delivery service -within
a 202(c) terminal area.62 This statement is dictum, because the inter-
pretation of 202(c) rather than 208(b)(7a) was in issue, but it does show
that the restrictive definition of "incidental" culminating in the
Zantop decision is not the only possible interpretation of the exemp-
tion.63
There are no grounds for differential interpretations of "incidental"
Neither the words of the exemption, nor its statutory context, nor
the general goals of the Commission justify the narrow interpretation
physical possibility, should govern the finding that substitution has or has not taken
place.
62. Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 54 M.C.C. 21. 6M69 (1952). In this case.
the freight forwarders sought to argue that "collection and delivery services" (the phxa-e
used in section 202(c) of the Act) beyond commercial zones and terminal areas could be
exempted because they were still "incidental" to their long-haul carload movements. The
Commission answered by citing 203(b)(7a). which uses 'Incidentar ° but not "terminal
areas."
In a number of cases . . the question whether particular motor transportation is
"incidental" to transportation by aircraft has been found to depend upon whether
the motor transportation was limited to a bona fide terminal service .... Patently.
the finding in these cases that transportation within the .. . exemption [section
20(b)(7a)] is limited generally to terminal transportation .. . does not amount to
a finding that every service which is incidental or subordinate to, or the result of,
another service is necessarily bona fide collection and delivery service. Certainly, the
fact that the forwarders' concentration and distribution services are incidental and
subordinate to their long-haul .. .movements does not mean that they are bona
fide collection and delivery services.
54 M.C.C. 21, 68-69 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
63. In lieu of specific statutory language, the Commission often relies upon Declara-
tion of National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), to justify particular decisions.
See Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 351 U.S. 56 (1956) (the National Transportation
Policy is the yardstick by which ICC policy decisions must be measured). In .Motor
Transportation of Property, 95 M.C.C. 71, 84 (1964). the Commission commented that
we believe, having reviewed our past decisions involving section 203(b)(7a), that our
prior interpretation is essentially correct ... and is consonant with the aims of the
national transportation policy.
The policy statement declares it to be Congressional policy
to provide for fair and impartial regulation . . . of transportation subject to the
. .. Act, ... to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each [mode);
to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic
conditions in transportation and among the several carriers . . . to the end of
developing . . . a national transportation system ....
Declaration of National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940). Unless this statement
is interpreted to mean that the traffic of Commission-regulated carriers is to be protected
come what may-an implausible interpretation in view of the manifold exemptions con-
tained in Part II of the Act-it gives the Commission no clear guidance in interpreting
the exemption. To show inconsistency of a broad interpretation of the exemption with
the National Transportation Policy, the Commission would need to show that this inter-
pretation would not "preserve the inherent advantages" of some mode of transportation.
or that it would result in unfair or biased regulation, or that it would lead to unsafe
or uneconomic operating conditions in transportation. This the Commission has yet to do.
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of "incidental to transportation by aircraft." Whether or not the nar-
row interpretation of the exemption justifies judicial overruling of
the limitation of 203(b)(7a) to intra-community service,04 the Commis-
sion ought to withdraw the 1964 regulations in favor of a broader
interpretation of the exemption consistent with the promotional pur-
pose of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
64. In the only case other than Zantop in which specific application of 203(b)(7a) has
been challenged, the District Court relied upon the "rational basis" test to uphold Com-
mission application of the 25 mile rule to a particular carrier. Wycoff Co. v. United
States, 240 F. Supp. 804 (D. Utah 1965). The District Court affirmation of Motor Trans-
portation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71 (1964),
extended only to the power of the Commission to define the scope of the 203(b)(7a) ex-
emption in a general rule-making proceeding, The court stated that "inquiry Into the
substance of the regulations would be premature." Air Dispatch, Inc. v. United States,
237 F. Supp. 450, 453 (ED. Pa. 1964), afj'd per curiam, 381 U.S. 412 (1965).
Should a case arise in which the Commission unequivocally holds that the analogy of
203(b)(7a) to the 202(c) terminal areas exemption requires "incidental-to-air" transporta-
tion to be limited to intra-community terminal area service, the Commission ought to
be reversed as a matter of law. Otherwise, the outcome depends upon whether the courts
permit substitution of judicial interpretation of "incidental to transportation by aircraft"
for the Commission's interpretation, or decide that the Commission has broad discretion
in applying the exemption, thus limiting the reviewing court to determining whether the
finding "has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law," NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). Compare Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Shannon, 877 U.S. 311 (1964) (affirming District Court reversal of Commission finding of
illegal for-hire carriage) with United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1962) (in a similar
situation, reinstating Commission finding of illegal for-hire carriage). The arguments for
and against judicial intervention in comparable circumstances are set forth in 4 DAvIS,
AnMIIsmATivE LAw 189-240 (1958).
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